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1. Introduction  
 
In 2009 European Union celebrated the 10th anniversary of the introduction of the euro as its 
common currency. In a report published in 2008 the European Commission claimed that the first decade 
of the Economic and Monetary Union was a “resounding success” (European Commission, 2008). Those 
words turned out to be premature. Soon after the celebrations were over, the euro area was tossed into a 
severe crisis from which it has yet to fully emerge from.  
The extant macroeconomics literature has identified a private sector credit boom and related 
current account deficits as major causes for the crisis (Lane, 2012). This paper aims to participate in this 
debate on the roots of the crisis by providing firm-level evidence on corporate financing choices before 
the onset of the crisis. In particular, we examine if the euro has led to an increase in the use of debt 
financing for companies hailing from the euro area compared to other European companies. 
Previous research by Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006, 2009) show that the introduction of the 
euro resulted in increases in corporate valuations and investments for euro area firms compared to other 
European firms. Bris et al. attribute these findings mainly to a decrease in cost of equity and debt capital. 
As a result of decreased cost of capital, the demand for external financing is expected to have increased in 
the euro area compared to other comparable European countries.  The supply of capital may have also 
increased in the euro area. For example, euro area financial markets have become less segmented since 
the introduction of the euro, as manifested by the increase in cross-border portfolio investments, in 
particular for bonds (see, e.g., De Santis and Gerard, 2006; Lane, 2006; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). 
Thus firms have become less dependent on domestic investors when raising external financing. In 
addition, the implementation of the ambitious legislation known as the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) during the first half of 2000’s has made it easier to provide financial services throughout the 
European Union and thus could have facilitated cross-border financial intermediation (Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Papaioannou, and Peydro, 2010). The euro countries may have been particularly well positioned to take 
advantage of this regulatory integration by already sharing a common currency. 
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We provide evidence that the introduction of the euro has led to an increase in external financing, 
especially debt financing, for firms hailing from euro countries. Based on our sample of public firms, 
non-financial firms are likely to have significantly contributed towards current account deficits among the 
crisis countries by borrowing more. Our results are stronger for firms from those euro countries that 
previously had weak currencies, consistent with the idea that increased external financing is due to higher 
demand for financing. However, there is clear evidence that increased supply has also been a major 
contributing factor. Large firms, who have better access to foreign banks and investors, have increased 
their debt financing more, despite of the fact that previous research show that their valuations increased 
less than the valuations for smaller firms [see Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2009) for relative valuations]. 
Moreover, firms in industries that are more dependent on external financing have increased their debt 
financing more. Finally, results are stronger during the second half of our time period, partially due to the 
implementation of FSAP. These findings support the idea that improved supply of capital has led to 
increased use of external financing among the euro countries.   
We estimate regressions where the change in total external financing, the change in debt, or the 
change in external equity, all normalized by lagged assets, are the dependent variables. As explanatory 
variables we use measures of size, profitability, collateral, a proxy for industry level growth opportunities 
(corresponding U.S. industry Tobin’s Q), together with dummies indicating firms in the euro area for the 
time the common currency has been in use.  Our sample consists of 2,486 firms from 16 European 
countries in the period 1991-2006. In particular, we use corporate-level data from the eleven original 
countries that adopted the euro in 1999, and as our control sample we use the three EU countries that did 
not adopt the euro (Denmark, Sweden, and the U.K) as well as Norway and Switzerland. Using a control 
sample allows us to compute differences-in-differences estimators to measure the impact of the euro both 
cross-sectionally and in the time-series domain. 
We show that the introduction of the euro has on average lead to a 1.9% annual increase in 
external financing relative to assets for companies from the euro area compared to companies from our 
control countries. When we split the sample of euro firms between firms in weak euro countries (i.e., 
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countries that suffered a currency crisis in the years before the introduction of the euro) and strong euro 
countries, we find that for the weak euro countries the annual increase in external financing is 4.2% of 
assets, composed of 2.6% increase in debt financing and 1.4% increase in external equity financing.  For 
strong euro countries there is no increase in external financing, but equity issuance increases by 0.8% 
annually.   
We also estimate individual country results, using firms from the U.K. as the benchmark.  Among 
the individual euro countries, the results are the strongest for firms from the now troubled countries of 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, as well as for firms from the currently financially more solid northern euro 
countries of France, Netherlands, and Finland.1 Among the non-euro countries, Denmark stands out as the 
only country in which firms on average significantly increase their external financing, in particular debt 
financing, after 1999. 
Among industries, the results are the strongest for basic industries (agriculture, mining, and 
construction) and for service industries among the weak euro countries. Since construction is part of basic 
industries, the results for that industry are not surprising in view of the real estate boom in some euro 
countries. However, we should bear in mind that our results are relative to the control group, which is 
dominated by the firms from the U.K., and that the U.K. also experienced a real estate boom.   
The results showing that firms from weak euro countries have on average raised more external 
financing than firms from strong euro countries is consistent with the explanation that demand for 
financing has increased, since Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006, 2009) show that the weak euro firms 
experienced higher increases in Q and investment levels after the introduction of the euro. In order to 
examine if supply of financing is also a major contributing factor for the increase in external financing in 
the euro area, we classify industries to be dependent on external financing by measuring the fraction of 
investments financed by external finance in corresponding industries in the U.S. between 1991 and 1997 
(following the procedure of Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We then show that industries that are dependent 
                                                 
1 Note that Finland is classified as a weak euro-country in our analysis as it was hit by a significant currency crisis in 
the early 1990s 
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on external financing have significantly increased their debt and equity financing compared to the control 
group after the introduction of the euro. The result holds for all euro firms, but it is much stronger for 
firms from weak euro countries (annual increase is 3.9% of assets in debt financing and 1.6% in equity 
financing). Interestingly, the results for debt financing are also stronger for large firms (defined as having 
above sample median average sales in the pre-euro period). For example, large firms from weak euro 
countries have increased their debt financing by 3.2% of assets annually, whereas the increase for smaller 
firms is 2.2%. One possible explanation is that larger firms have the most to gain from financial market 
integration, as international investors and banks have a preference for larger, more well-established firms. 
Consistent with this view, Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2010) show that large firms dominate financing 
from international capital markets.  
We further show that external financing has increased more in the 2003-2006 time period  than in 
the 1999-2002 period, even though a significant increase in valuations occurred already in the earlier 
time-period (Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson, 2009). If demand for financing were the sole factor 
contributing for greater use for external financing, firms should have raised more financing already in 
1999-2002. One mechanism that has contributed to stronger results in the latter half of our sample is the 
adoption of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). FSAP is an EU-wide legislative program whose 
purpose is to facilitate cross-border provision of financial services. Our result for euro countries is 
partially explained by including an index that reflects when the actual legislation was implemented in 
different member countries. 
Next, we analyze the use of external financing by looking at the effect of the euro on changes in 
non-cash assets, changes in cash holdings, changes in dividend payments, and changes in total payouts.  
Consistent with the corporate investment results in Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006), we find that euro 
firms have significantly increased their non-cash assets relative to other firms. Interestingly, cash 
holdings, dividends or total payouts have not grown compared to our control group. Firms that belong to 
industries that are more dependent on external financing have experienced higher growth in non-cash 
assets. Better access to financing has thus had real consequences. Consistent with the external financing 
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results, the growth in non-cash assets has been faster after 2002. Even though valuations increased 
immediately when euro was introduced, it seems to have taken some time before the institutional 
framework was ready to support increased firm growth. 
Next section reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the data sources, and the variables used in 
the paper. Section 4 discusses the methods and main results.  Section 5 studies how dependence on 
external financing affects financing. Section 6 provides evidence on the importance of deepening 
financial integration and regulatory harmonization over time. Section 7 focuses on asset growth. Finally, 
Section 8 concludes. 
   
2. Related literature 
 
The extant macroeconomics literature on the euro crisis has started to emphasize private sector credit 
booms and related current account deficits as perhaps the most important explanatory factors for the euro 
crisis. For example, Lane (2012) documents the dramatic increase in private sector credit and current 
account deficits that occurred for those euro countries that are now engulfed in severe recessions. Lane 
(2013) shows that capital flows in the euro area were dominated by debt and that the increase in net 
foreign debt is positively correlated with growth in private credit for euro countries before the crisis. We 
complement these aggregate results by providing firm-level evidence for significant increases in external 
financing, in particular debt financing, in the euro area. Consistent with the macroeconomics literature, 
our results are stronger for firms hailing from the crisis countries.2  
Some of our results are consistent with the view that the cost of capital has decreased in the euro area, 
leading to a surge in that demand for external financing. There is strong evidence for the decline in cost of 
capital in the euro area. Bartram and Karolyi (2006) show that systematic risk has been significantly 
reduced due to the introduction of the euro. Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos, and Priestley (2007) find 
evidence that the cost of equity has decreased in the euro area since the introduction of the euro, and that 
                                                 
2 For a pre-crisis overview of the macroeconomic effects of the euro, see Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010). 
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there is no similar reduction in cost of capital for those EU countries that that chose not to adopt the euro 
as their currency. Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2009) find evidence for cost of equity reduction using 
Tobin’s Q-ratios: valuations measured using Q-rations have increased after the introduction of the euro, 
especially for countries that devalued their currencies during the EMS-crisis of 1992-93. Hassan (2013) 
shows that the cost of equity has decreased in the euro area for the non-tradable sector and that real 
interest rates have declined, because bonds denominated in euro provide better insurance against 
consumption shocks than bonds issued in the legacy currencies would have provided. Based on this 
literature, we would expect firms in the euro area on increase their external financing, and this is indeed 
what we find.3 
Some of our results cannot be explained by a decrease in the cost of capital. For example large firms 
have increased their external financing more despite the fact that their valuation have increased less than 
the valuations for smaller firms. One reason for this is that large firms are better positioned to benefit 
from financial integration. There is plenty of evidence that financial markets have become less segmented 
and more integrated in the euro area. For example, Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos, and Priestley (2006) show 
that excess stock returns in the euro area have become more sensitive to common euro risk at the expense 
of country-specific risks. Cappiello, Kadareja, and Manganelli (2010) show that co-movements between 
European stock market returns have increased since 1999, which implies increased stock market 
integration. Corporate bond markets have also become more integrated and credit spreads have converged 
across the euro area. Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova, and Monnet (2004) show that since the adoption 
of the euro, the impact of country-factors in explaining credit spreads has become economically small and 
that credit spreads are more influenced by fundamental factors like ratings and maturity.  
 Transactions costs for buying euro area assets have declined significantly since the introduction 
of the euro. Coeurdacier and Martin (2009) provide evidence that the costs for buying euro area bonds 
and stocks have decreased significantly.  Lower transactions costs, elimination of intra euro area 
                                                 
3 Contrary to the prevailing evidence, Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2013) find no evidence for a euro 
effect. Bekaert et al. (2013) study valuation differentials and they show that there is a strong European Union effect: 
bilateral valuation differentials are significantly lower for EU members than for non-members. 
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exchange rate risk, and currency matching rules for assets and liabilities becoming irrelevant within euro 
area, have resulted in a dramatic increase in cross-border portfolio investments between euro countries. 
The increase is portfolio investments is more pronounced for bonds (see, e.g., Lane, 2006; De Santis and 
Gerard, 2006), but cross-border holdings within euro area have also increased significantly for equities 
(see, e.g., De Santis and Gerard, 2006; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Finally, Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010) show that bilateral bank holdings have also increased between euro 
countries by 25-30% compared to other EU members.  
Increased cross-border portfolio investments imply that firms in the euro area are less dependent 
on domestic markets for their financing needs and in particular that firms that were previously financially 
constrained due to underdeveloped domestic financial markets would be expected to increase their 
external financing more than other firms. Consistent with this, we find that firms from industries that are 
more dependent on external financing have increased their debt financing more than firms that are less 
dependent on external financing.    
 We are not the first ones to emphasize that changes supply of capital matter for firms’ financing 
choices. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) compare firms that have bond ratings – and thus access to bond 
markets – to firms that do not. They show that firms with bond ratings have 35% more debt in their 
capital structures. Like Faulkender and Petersen (2006) we show that even large corporations may face 
financing constraints and that access to credit markets is a significant determinant in firms’ financing 
choices. Papers by Leary (2009), Sufi (2009), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010) identify exogenous 
shocks that have led to a change in the supply of capital. Leary (2009) finds that the emergence of market 
for certificate of deposits in 1961 and the resulting expansion in bank credit led to increased leverage for 
firms. Sufi (2009) shows that the introduction of syndicated loan ratings in 1995 led to increased 
borrowing by firms that obtained a rating. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) study the collapse of Drexel 
Burnham Lambert and the resulting decrease in high-yield bond financing and show that this led to a 
decrease in financing and investments for those firms that were using high-yield debt financing. The 
introduction of the euro is also an exogenous event, implemented partially for political reasons [as argued 
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by Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2009)]. However, since the euro is likely to have affected both the 
demand for and supply for capital, its introduction alone cannot provide direct evidence that an increase 
in supply of capital is a major cause for the observed increase in external financing. For that purpose, we 
utilize the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) that aims to facilitate the 
provision of cross-border financial services within the EU. Like Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and 
Peydro (2010), we use the differences in the timing of implementation for FSAP across EU member states 
and show that the implementation of FSAP partially explains the increase in external financing. Thus, like 
Leary (2009), Sufi (2009), and Lemmon and Roberts (2010), we utilize an exogenous shock to highlight 
the importance of supply of capital in firms’ financing choices. 
 
3. Data description 
 
3.1. Sample 
The sample of firms used in this study is gathered from Worldscope and covers the period 1991- 
2006.  The sample includes firms from the eleven countries that first adopted the euro at its introduction 
in January 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Our comparison sample of firms is drawn from three EU, non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the U.K.) as well as from Norway and Switzerland. We consider these 
five non-euro countries to constitute appropriate benchmark countries for an analysis of the impact of the 
euro on firms’ financing activities. Denmark, Sweden, and the U.K. all opted out from joining the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)4 at the outset. Norway and Switzerland obviously cannot join 
EMU as non-EU countries, but at the same time they are tightly integrated with the EU in many areas 
                                                 
4 To be more precise, the third phase of the EMU, which deals with the adoption of the euro. The first and second 
phases of the EMU dealt with free movement of capital and monetary policy coordination between independent 
central banks. 
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relevant to business thanks to geographical proximity and follow EU regulations because of the European 
Economic Area – agreement.5 
As is standard in corporate finance research, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). 
We also exclude firm-year observations missing any data in Worldscope needed to construct our outcome 
variables or full set of firm-level control variables. Furthermore, we exclude firm-year observations with 
zero sales or negative book values of equity.   Finally we require that the remaining firms appear in the 
sample for at least one year during 1991-1997 and at least one year during 1999-2006.  This last 
requirement ensures that firms exist both before and after the introduction of the euro in January 1999. 
Firms that appear only in 1998 in the pre-euro period are excluded because by then it was clear that the 
euro would come to fruition, and that fact could have been a factor behind firms’ decision to go public at 
the time. Because we do not require that the firms exist for the whole sample period of 1991-2006, we 
end up with an unbalanced panel of firms.  
Our final sample consists of 2,486 firms (29,332 firm-year observations): 1,348 firms (16,098 
firm-year observations) from the euro countries and 1,138 firms (13,834 firm-year observations) from the 
non-euro countries. Germany and France together contribute more than half of the firms to the euro 
sample (742 firms; 8,753 firm-year observations); whereas the U.K. dominates the non-euro sample with 
696 firms (8,523 firm-year observations). Although firms in Germany, France and the U.K. make up a 
majority of the sample, our results are robust to excluding all of these observations.   
 
3.2. Variables 
Appendix A lists the full technical definitions of the variables used in this study and Appendix B 
presents summary statistics for the whole sample.  
                                                 
5 Greece was a non-euro, EU member at the time of the initial introduction of the euro and was actively looking to 
adopt the euro. However, because Greece did not fulfill the convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty, the country 
did not officially adopt the euro until January 2001. We exclude Greece from the main analysis because it is difficult 
to classify Greece as either a non-euro or euro country in 1999 and 2000. We also exclude the new euro-members – 
Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia – for the same reason and also for the reason that for these 
countries there are very few observations available. 
10 
 
To capture firms financing activities we construct three different variables: Net Debt Issues, Net 
Equity Issues, and Net External Finance. Net Debt Issues is defined as the net change in the book value of 
total financial debt over a given year divided by the lagged book value of assets. Similarly, Net Equity 
Issues is defined as the net change in external equity divided by the lagged book value of assets.  We 
calculate the net change in external equity any given year as reported proceeds from sales of common and 
preferred stock minus purchases and retirements of common and preferred stock as stated in a firms’ cash 
flow statement. When the data on proceeds from equity issues or repurchases are missing (4,461 firm-
year observations), we instead calculate the variable as the change in the book value of common and 
preferred stock minus the change in retained earnings. This latter definition is clearly an approximation of 
net equity issued, but our results are qualitatively the same if we constrain our sample to those firm-years 
with complete information in their cash flow statement on equity issues and repurchases. Finally, we 
define Net External Finance as the sum of Net Debt Issues and Net Equity Issues. Because the net debt 
and equity issues variables are expressed as fractions of the past period’s assets, Net External Finance 
captures the net contribution of all external financing activities to asset growth. We winsorize the 
financing variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the influence of extremely fast growing or 
shrinking firms (mainly caused by M&As and divestitures). Appendix B show that over the entire time 
period we study, non-euro firms on average raise more external capital per year than euro firms (4.2% of 
previous year’s assets vs. 3.7%). This larger external financing activity appears to be due to larger equity 
issues.   
Regarding other firm characteristics used in this study, Appendix B shows that euro firms on 
average have larger sales, lower growth opportunities (as measured by median industry Q for 
corresponding US firms), less collateral value, and somewhat greater profitability (EBITDA/assets).  
Turning to the country characteristics we use as control variables, Appendix B shows that euro 
countries on average grew faster during the whole sample period than non-euro countries, although this is 
mainly due to Ireland. It is also notable that euro countries had on average a much larger bond term 
spread (41 basis points larger).  
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4. The euro and external financing: main results 
 
4.1. Empirical methodology 
To analyze the impact of the formation of the euro on firms’ external financing activities, we 
employ a standard difference-in-differences methodology. That is, we estimate the impact of the euro by 
comparing differences in financing activities before and after the euro for the firms in the euro countries 
and compare these differences with the comparable differences for a sample of firms from non-euro 
countries. More formally, for our sample in which firm i is observed annually at year t, we estimate the 
effect of the euro on financing variable y in OLS regressions of the following kind: 
yit  = αi + θt + β Xit + δ EUROit  + εit,              (1) 
where αi  is the fixed firm effect for firm i,  θt  is the fixed time effect for year t, Xit is a vector of time-
varying control variables,  EUROit is a dummy variable  indicating whether or not the euro was adopted 
by firm i’s country at time t, and  εit,is the residual. To control for serial dependence within a country, we 
estimate standard errors robust to clustering at the country level.  
The fixed firm effects control for any unobserved constant factors that could influence firms’ 
financing choices (this includes constant industry and country factors). The fixed time effects control for 
time trends common for both euro and non-euro firms. Because of the inclusion of these time dummies, 
the coefficient δ is the difference-in-differences estimator of the impact of the euro.  
The dummy variable EURO in equation (1) is equal to 1 if the year is 1999 or later and the firm 
belongs to a country that adopted the euro, otherwise it is 0. As an alternative specification, we replace 
EURO with two dummies indicating firms in strong and weak euro countries, respectively, in the post-
euro period. The weak euro countries are the euro countries that had to abandon their pegged exchange 
rates or devalue their currencies during the ERM crisis of 1992-93. We make the distinction between 
strong and weak euro countries since Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006, 2009) show that the weak euro 
firms experienced higher increases in valuations and investment levels after the introduction of the euro. 
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They attributed these results to a removal of devaluation risk and resulting decrease in the cost of capital. 
An alternative justification for classifying euro countries into weak and strong is that the classification 
could be a proxy for international financing constraints. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) argue that 
firms face two kinds of collateral constraints in borrowing: domestic and international constraints. 
Because of a history of devaluations, firms in weak euro countries may have faced more stringent 
international financing constraints than firms in strong euro countries. 
One important concern regarding the validity of the difference-in-differences estimation outlined 
above is the parallel trends assumption. If the control sample of non-euro firms has a different underlying 
trend regarding financing activities than the euro firms prior to the introduction of the euro, we may 
estimate a significant difference-in-differences effect that is not caused by the introduction of the euro, 
but is rather just an artifact of already diverging trends in the dependent variables between the two groups 
of firms.6  We perform the following informal test of the parallel trends assumption: First we define the 
two years right before the introduction of the euro (i.e., years 1997 and 1998) as the Late Convergence 
Period.  We then estimate Eq. (1) above for the time period 1991-1998 only, where the EURO dummies 
are replaced with similar dummies indicating that a firm is a euro firm and the time is the Late 
Convergence Period. Appendix C displays the results from this exercise. The results show that there is no 
significant difference in financing activities between euro firms and non-euro firms during the Late 
Convergence Period relative to the prior years (1991-1996). These results are consistent with the parallel 
trends assumption holding in our data. 
 
4.2. Univariate results 
Before turning to our regression analysis, we first present some univariate difference-in-
differences results in Table 1. For each of our three financing variables, we calculate an average for the 
pre-euro period and the post-euro period separately. We then calculate the difference between the post-
euro and the pre-euro averages, which gives us a firm specific difference in means. The pre-and post euro 
                                                 
6 See Roberts and Whited (2012) for a more in-depth discussion of the importance of the parallel trends assumption 
for the validity of difference-in-differences estimators. 
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individual firm averages as well as within-firm differences are then averaged across all firms in the euro 
countries and non-euro countries, respectively.  
Panel A of Table 1 show that euro firms on average decrease their yearly net external financing, 
expressed as a fraction of last year’s assets, with -0.002 following the introduction of the euro, but the 
decrease is not statistically significant. Non-euro firms’ change in Net External Finance is -0.030 
(significant at the 1%-level).  The difference-in-differences between euro and non-euro firms is strongly 
statistically significant (at the 1%-level) according to t-tests, implying that non-euro firms decrease their 
external financing more. Looking at strong versus weak euro firms, we see that strong euro firms on 
average decrease their yearly external financing by -0.010 (significant at the 1%-level) whereas weak 
euro firms increase theirs by 0.018 (significant at the 1%-level). However, the difference-in-differences 
between strong euro firms and non-euro firms is still significant (at the 1%-level). The difference-in-
differences between weak and strong euro firms is also significant (at the 1%- level). 
Panels B and C show that the patterns for Net Debt Issues and Net Equity Issues. Non-euro firms 
significantly decrease both debt and equity issues on average, whereas there is an insignificant increase in 
Net Debt Issues and a significant (at the 5%-level) decrease in Net Equity Issues for euro firms overall. 
The difference-in-differences between non-euro and euro firms is significant for both debt and equity 
issues.  For weak vs. strong euro firms, we see that strong euro firms experience an insignificant decrease 
in their debt issues. By contrast weak euro firms significantly increase their debt issues (an increase of 
0.030, significant at the 1%-level). For equity issues there is a significant decrease for strong euro firms, 
whereas for the weak euro firms the decrease is insignificant. The change for both groups is significantly 
different from the change for non-euro firms. 
Overall, the univariate difference-in-differences evidence suggests that the euro has enabled euro 
firms to increase their external financing relative to non-euro firms. This seems to be particularly true for 
weak euro firms, who increase their debt financing also in absolute terms and not just relative to non-euro 
firms.   
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4.3. Main regression results 
We next estimate the regression outlined in Eq. (1) above. We run two different specifications of 
the regression model for each of three dependent variables (Net External Finance, Net Debt Issues, and 
Net Equity Issues), one with one single euro dummy, and one with different euro dummies for strong euro 
firms and weak euro firms, respectively. As control variables we use five different firm characteristics, all 
of which are lagged one year relative to our outcome variables: US Industry Q,  Log(sales), 
EBITDA/Assets,  Collateral/Assets, and a dummy variable indicating whether leverage (expressed as total 
liabilities/assets) is above 90% [ I(Leverage>90%)]. US Industry Q is our proxy for a firm’s investment 
opportunities and is the median Q of US firms in the same two-digit SIC code and year. We do not use 
firms’ individual Q ratios because Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2009) show that they are affected by the 
introduction of the euro and are therefore endogenous in this setting. Log(sales) is our proxy for firm size 
and is calculated using sales in real USD. EBITDA/Assets is a measure of a firms operating profitability, 
and Collateral/Assets is meant to capture the debt capacity of tangible assets.  Versions of these four 
variables have previously been used, for example, by Sufi (2009) to explain the use of external debt 
financing. We also add  I(Leverage>90%) as control variable based on the idea that firms with extreme 
leverage ratios have exhausted their debt capacity and are more or less forced to issue equity when they 
raise external capital.7  
Finally, we add three country characteristics as control variables: GDP Growth, Term Spread, and 
Change in USD Exchange rate.  GDP Growth (the real GDP growth rate) is included to capture 
differences in contemporaneous business cycles across countries and Term Spread (the 10-year 
government bond rate minus the 6-month t-bill rate) is included because it captures expectations of future 
growth and inflation, which can affect firms current financing decisions. Both of these variables are 
lagged one year relative to the outcome variables.   Change in USD Exchange rate, defined as the 
percentage change in the domestic currency/USD exchange rate from the end of the previous year to the 
                                                 
7 Our results are robust to the use of other specifications to control for the level of leverage at the beginning of each 
year, including using the leverage ratio directly.   
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end of the current year, is included because the firm level accounting variables that form the basis for our 
outcome variables are measured in USD and we want to make sure that we capture actual firm decisions 
and not just differences in dollar value fluctuations across currencies.  
Table 2 presents the main estimation results. We see that the introduction of the euro has lead to 
an annual increase in external financing equal to 1.9% of beginning-of-year assets for companies from the 
euro area compared to companies from our control countries (significant at the 10% level) . The annual 
increase is 1% for external equity financing (significant at the 1%-level), but there is no significant 
increase in debt financing.  When we split the sample of euro firms between firms in weak-euro and 
strong euro countries, we find that for the weak euro countries the annual increase in external financing is 
4.2% (significant at the 1%- level), composed of a 2.6% increase in debt financing and 1.4% increase in 
external equity financing (both effects significant at the 1%-level).  For strong euro countries there is no 
significant increase in external financing, but equity financing has increased by 0.8 % per year 
(significant at the 5%-level.  The larger increases in total external financing, as well as the larger increase 
in debt and equity issues for weak euro firms versus strong euro firms are all statistically significant at the 
1% level.  
In Table 2 we classified firms as weak or strong euro firms. The results in that table could be due 
to the fact that firms from France, Germany, and the U.K. dominate the sample. In order to make sure that 
a few large countries do not determine the results we present results by individual countries in Table 3. 
We use the U.K. as the benchmark, so all the results are relative to the U.K. results. The results are what 
we expect them to be, with some exceptions. Firms from weak euro countries have increased both their 
debt and equity financing. The results are especially strong for Italy and Spain, where the annual increase 
for external financing is 4.5% and 8.2% of assets, respectively. The increase is due to both debt and 
equity financing, but the increase in debt financing is the predominant reason. The outlier among the 
weak euro countries is Ireland, where the net external financing is not showing any increase and debt 
financing has actually decreased modestly (a decrease of 0.9% per year). The Irish results are consistent 
with the findings of Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2009), who show that Ireland didn’t experience any 
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increase in corporate valuations after the introduction of the euro. The effects for strong euro countries are 
generally lower than the effects for weak euro countries. The exception among the strong euro countries 
is Netherlands, which has experienced an increase in external financing of 3.1% per year, comparable to 
increases in weak euro countries like Finland and Portugal. Among the control group only Denmark 
shows significant increases in debt and equity financing. Denmark is different from all other non-euro 
countries: it is the only non-euro country in our sample that has maintained a tight currency peg with 
respect to the euro. Thus it may not be that surprising that Denmark is behaving like a euro country.  
In Table 4 we show the external financing results by industry. Some weak euro countries, 
especially Ireland and Spain, experienced dramatic increases in real estate prices resulting in construction 
booms. We want to examine to what extent our results can be explained by that. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that real estate played a significant part in the increase in external financing, basic industries 
(including construction) experience very high increases in external financing. For weak euro countries the 
increase is 6.9% of assets annually (significant at the 10%-level), largely driven by the increase in debt 
financing (an increase of 6.4% annually, significant at the 1%-level). However, services industries show 
the largest increases for the weak euro countries: 7.9% increase in external financing, with 5.4% increase 
in debt financing annually. In addition, for the weak euro countries, manufacturing (3.5% increase in 
external financing) and transportation, communications, and utilities (4.8% increase in external financing) 
show strong results. The increase in external financing for manufacturing can be attributed both to debt 
financing (an increase of 1.9% annually) and equity financing (1.4% increase). For transportation, 
communications, and utilities the increase is solely due to debt financing (an increase of 4.4% annually). 
Thus among the weak euro countries, the increases in external financing are widely spread among 
different industries and not attributable only to basic industries, which construction is a part of. 
For strong euro countries the increases in net external financing are largely due to increases in 
equity financing, with the exception of basic industries, where both debt and equity financing show 
statistically and economically significant increases.  
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5. External finance dependence and the effect of the euro on financing activities 
 
To further examine the reasons for the increase in external financing, we follow Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) and classify industries’ level of dependence on external financing by measuring the 
fraction of capital expenditures financed by external funds in corresponding industries in the U.S. 
between 1991 and 1997.  Rajan and Zingales argue that because the United States have relatively 
frictionless financial markets, U.S. industries external finance dependence is likely to capture the 
technological demand for external finance. For our purpose, the U.S. industry external dependence 
provides us with an external finance dependence measure that is exogenous to the formation of EMU. 
Specifically, we first match our sample industries to corresponding U.S. industries based on two 
digit SIC codes. We then identify all U.S. firms in corresponding industries over the 1991-1997 time 
period. For each industry-matched U.S. firm, we calculate the individual fraction of capital expenditures 
financed by external funds as the sum of external financing (= capital expenditures minus net cash flow 
from operating activities) divided by the sum of capital expenditures over 1991-1997. We then calculate 
the median external finance dependence by industry and use that as the overall measure of an industry’s 
external finance dependence. Finally we classify an industry (and consequently any firm in this industry) 
as more external finance dependent if its industry has a higher external finance dependence than the 
median industry represented in the sample (external finance dependence = 0.211). Remaining industries 
are consequently labeled as less external finance dependent.   
Table 5 replicates our main analysis in Table 2 but splits the sample in two according to external 
finance dependence.  Panel A shows the estimation results for the more external finance dependent 
subsample and Panel B shows the equivalent results for less external finance dependent subsample. We 
see that the effect of the euro on external financing activity is much larger in magnitude in more external 
finance dependent industries. In the more dependent sample, firms in the euro area on average increase 
Net External Finance by 2.7% of assets more than non-euro firms following the introduction of the euro 
(significant at the 1%-level). In the less dependent sample, there is no increase in overall external 
18 
 
financing, but net equity issues increase by 0.9% annually. When we distinguish between strong and weak 
euro firms, we see that weak euro firms in both subsamples increase their external financing significantly 
(5.6% for more dependent firms, 3.3% for less dependent), but the results are much weaker or even non-
existent for strong euro firms (1.6% increase for more finance dependent firms, statistically significant at 
the 10%-level, and no increase for the less dependent firms). This is consistent with the results in Table 2.  
Looking at the results for Net Debt Issues and Net Equity Issues we see that the comparatively 
larger effect of the euro on total external financing is more due to an increase in debt issues than an 
increase in equity issues. In the more dependent sample, weak euro firms increase Net Debt Issues with 
3.9% of assets versus an increase of 1.9% in the less dependent sample. For Net Equity Issues the increase 
is 1.6% in the more dependent sample versus 1.2% in the less dependent sample for the weak euro firms.  
The results in Table 5 show that the introduction of the euro has improved access to financing, 
since more external finance dependent firms have experienced consistently larger increases. This is 
especially true for weak euro firms and their debt financing. To further examine the role of access to 
financing and financial integration, we analyze financing activities conditional on firm size. As shown by 
Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler (2010) very few firms account for a large portion of international capital 
raisings. Based on the evidence provided by Gozzi et al. we would expect the effect of the euro to be 
greater for larger firms.  
In Table 6, we split the sample between large and small firms and estimate our baseline 
regressions for each subsample. We first rank firms based on average yearly sales in real USD over the 
1991-1997 time period. Next we designate firms as large if they have higher average sales than the 
sample median, otherwise they are classified as small. Panel A of Table 6 displays the results for large 
firms and Panel B does the same for small firms.  Consistent with our conjecture, we see that large euro 
firms have experienced a comparatively greater increase in external financing following the introduction 
of the euro. Moreover, the difference relative to smaller euro firms is largely due to greater debt 
financing.  
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6. Financial integration and financing activities 
 
Although the euro was adopted as the common currency in 1999, it might have taken much 
longer for the effects of the common currency to filter through to deepening financial integration. In 
Table 7 we further examine this by splitting the post-euro time period into one earlier period 1999-2002- 
and one later period (2003-2006).  If euro firms only increase external financing as a response to lower 
cost of capital and increased investment opportunities we would expect a relatively immediate increase in 
external financing because such positive demand shocks have been immediately recognized by financial 
markets and incorporated in company valuations when the euro was introduced (see Bris, Koskinen, and 
Nilsson, 2009).  On the other hand, it could be that it takes a longer time for the institutions of financial 
markets to change and thus also longer time for deepening financial integration to have an impact on 
corporate decisions. Table 7 shows that the increase in external financing is concentrated for the years 
2003-2006, supporting the hypothesis that changing financial institutions and resulting improved access 
to financing are the main drivers for our results. During the latter period both debt and equity financing 
increased for all euro firms. During the earlier period only the weak euro countries experienced increases 
in external financing. In addition, the effects for weak euro firms are significantly stronger for the latter 
period; the overall magnitude is about three times larger.  
By splitting the post-euro time to two periods and showing that the effects on financing are much 
larger in the latter period provides indirect evidence on the mechanisms of financial integration. We can 
also provide some direct evidence on the mechanisms of integration, since the introduction of the euro has 
also been followed by legal-regulatory harmonization across all of the European Union (EU). Following 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró (2010), we consider the impact of the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP) on corporate financing choices. FSAP was an initiative launched by the EU 
Commission and the EU Council in the late 1990s with the goal of harmonizing the financial intermediary 
market within the EU. The FSAP included various directives for new legislation to be adopted by the 
member countries.  The directives introduce new EU-wide legislation regarding securities settlements, 
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rules for bank reorganizations, money laundering, consumer protection in financial services, cross-
country mergers, insider dealing and market manipulation and transparency in securities markets. By 
establishing common rules these directives made financial integration more feasible.  
Empirical identification of the effect of FSAP implementation on corporate financing activities is 
facilitated by the fact that we have both cross-sectional and intertemporal heterogeneity in our sample 
with respect to FSAP implementation. In the cross-section, our sample contains two non-EU member 
countries (Norway and Switzerland) that are not part of FSAP, and firms from these two countries are 
thus our outright control sample. Intertemporally, we have variation across the EU-member states as to 
the implementation dates of different FSAP Directives. During our sample period 27 different directives 
had been initiated. However, the EU countries have discretion as to when the implementation of the 
directives into nation laws takes place. Delays of implementation by any member country are due to 
various technical and political reasons, with the end result that the date of implementation for any given 
directive can differ greatly across the EU-countries. Given our particular sample period, we will not 
consider implementation of directives that took place after 2005. This means that five out of the 27 issued 
directives are immediately excluded from the analysis. The remaining 22 Directives relate to three main 
financial intermediary markets: (i) banking (five directives), (ii) securities (ten directives), and (iii) 
insurance (seven directives). We gather the data on the directives and their implementation dates from 
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydro (2010).8   
The variable we use in our regression analysis to capture the effect of an individual countries’ 
legal implementation of the directives is FSAP index, defined as log(1+cumulative directive 
transpositions at year t for country i). This variable will always have a value of zero for firms from the 
two non-EU countries.  This variable is lagged one year relative to the dependent variables. We construct 
the index using only the directives within the banking and securities areas, since those are the two most 
directly relevant intermediary markets for corporations. A full list of the fifteen specific directives we thus 
                                                 
8 See Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró (2010) for a more detailed discussion on the FSAP directives and 
their transposition dates by member countries. 
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consider is listed in Appendix D. The number of these directives cumulatively adopted any given year by 
an EU member state range from zero to twelve during our sample period. 
Table 8 presents the results of our analysis. Columns (1) and (2) show that adding the FSAP index by 
itself does not alter our previous results regarding the impact of the euro on Net External Finance. 
However, when we also include an interaction of FSAP index with the euro firm indicator in Columns (3) 
and (4), we find that there is a significantly positive marginal effect of the FSAP directives on Net 
External Finance when the firm is a euro firm. The coefficient of FSAP index itself remains insignificant. 
At the same time, the magnitude of the basic effect of being a euro firm is reduced. This pattern of results 
is repeated also for Net Debt Issues and Net Equity Issues. It thus seems that there are complementarities 
between adopting the euro, and adopting a common legal framework for financial intermediation.   
 
7. The effect of the euro on asset growth and corporate payout  
 
So far we have documented a significant increase in external financing among euro firms 
following the introduction of the euro, in particular among firms from countries that suffered devaluations 
during the ERM crisis (i.e. the weak euro countries). In this section we analyze what these new funds 
have been used for.  In principal, new external funds would have to be used for asset growth or to increase 
the payout to shareholders.  Given the magnitude of the increase in financing, it is reasonable to expect 
that most of the funds have been used for asset growth. However, the type of asset growth should be able 
to tell us more about why the euro has facilitated an increase in external financing. If the euro has 
permanently improved the access to capital and lowered the cost of capital we would expect firms to 
mainly use any new funds raised to invest in productive assets. However, to the extent that firms believe 
the euro effect is temporary, we would expect firms to take the opportunity to increase their cash holdings 
to save for the future when financing conditions are expected to return to normal. 
In Table 9 we analyze to what extent the documented increase in external financing due to the 
euro is connected to asset growth versus an increase in dividends and total payouts, and also whether we 
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see a growth in non-cash assets versus cash holdings. To capture asset growth we use the variable Change 
in Assets, defined as the change in the total book value of assets during the year divided by the beginning-
of-year book value of assets. This variable is thus the growth rate in total assets. Growth in non-cash 
assets is captured by the variable Change in Non-Cash Assets, defined as the change in non-cash assets 
(=total assets minus cash and short-term investments)   over the year divided by the beginning-of-year 
book value of assets. The growth rate in non-cash assets is thus expressed as a fraction of all assets. 
Similarly the growth in cash holdings is measured by Change in Cash Holdings, defined as the change in 
cash and short-term investments over the year divided by the beginning-of-year book value of assets. We 
then measure Dividends as yearly dividends divided by the beginning-of-year book value of assets.  Firms 
could have also initiated stock repurchase programs. To capture this possibility we measure Total Payouts 
as yearly dividends plus stock repurchases divided by the beginning-of-year book value of assets. All five 
of these dependent variables are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentile values.  In each regression of 
Table 9 we included the same set of independent variables used in the external financing regressions (see 
Table 2).  
Panel A of Table 9 presents the regression results for the full sample of firms. Euro firms have 
increased their total assets by 3.7% annually (significant at the 10%-level). The effect is concentrated on 
weak euro firms: an increase of 7.1% (significant at the 1%-level). The euro has no effect on dividends 
nor on total payouts. Moreover, we see that the whole increase in total assets is due to a significant 
increase in non-cash assets; there is no significant effect on cash holdings. This result suggests that firms 
expect the positive effects of the euro to be permanent.  The results in Panel A are consistent with an 
increase in the supply of capital, but also with firms reacting to an increase in investment opportunities 
(demand effect).   
We know from Table 5 that euro firms in more external finance dependent industries increased 
their external financing comparatively more, which support that an increase if the supply of capital is an 
important driver of the overall results. In Panels B and C of Table 9 we similarly split the firms depending 
on external finance dependence to check that the external financing results also carry over to asset 
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growth.  Panel B presents the results for more external finance dependent industries, and Panel C presents 
results for less external finance dependent industries.  Results are very strong for firms in more finance 
dependent industries. The increase in total assets for weak euro firms is 9.9%, solely attributable to non-
cash assets. Even strong euro firms increase their non-cash assets (an increase of 3.5%). In less finance 
dependent industries results are weaker and significant only for weak euro firms.  
In Panel D we split the post-euro time to early (1999-2002) and late (2003-2006) time periods. 
Consistent with the financing results, firms have increased their non-cash assets more during the latter 
period: for the early period, weak euro firms increase their non-cash assets by 4.3%, in the late period by 
10.8%. The strong euro firms only exhibit an increase in the late period, when non-cash assets grow by 
6.5%.  
            
8. Conclusions 
 
We provide evidence that the firms in the euro area increased external financing before the crisis, 
compared to the firms from countries that didn't adopt the euro. This is especially true for debt financing. 
Our firm-level evidence is consistent with the aggregate-level results of Lane (2013), who shows that 
capital flows in the euro area were dominated by debt investments prior to the global financial crisis. Our 
results are stronger for firms from countries that previously had weak currencies and for firms that have 
the lowest foreign sales.  These results are consistent with the view that firms have increased financing 
because cost of financing decreased. We also find evidence that increased access to financing has been a 
major contributing factor in explaining increased use of external financing. Firms that were likely to be 
financially constrained prior to the introduction of the euro should experience the largest increases in 
external financing. Supporting this hypothesis, we find that firms in industries that are more dependent on 
external financing have increased their debt financing more.  Interestingly, we also find that large firms 
have increased their debt financing more. At first sight this result is counter-intuitive, since arguably 
small firms are more financially constrained than large firms. However, financial integration is more 
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likely to improve access to financing for larger firms, since typically only a few large firms account for a 
significant proportion of international debt financing (Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler, 2010). 
Improved access to financing, however, could be a double-edged sword. As shown by Maddaloni 
and Peydro (2011), softer lending standards fostered by low short-term interest rates before the crisis have 
led to worse economic performance during the crisis. Our evidence suggests that firms believed that the 
euro had positively altered the economic environment for the euro area and that the euro crisis was 
completely unexpected. This is manifested in firms' investment behavior: increased financing led to 
increased investments. If firms had thought that rougher times lay ahead, a prudent action would have 
been to increase their cash holdings. Given the beliefs and resulting stock valuations that prevailed prior 
to the crisis, it is difficult to claim firms financial behavior was reckless ex-ante. Consistent with this 
view, we can show that market leverage didn’t increase for the euro area firms prior to the crisis, despite 
the significant increases in debt financing.9 Stock valuations have turned out to be optimistic ex-post, but 
ex-ante the increase in debt financing seems to have been a rational response to a decrease in cost of 
financing and improved access to capital. 
                                                 
9 These leverage results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions   
Variable Definition (item # refers to Worldscope field)  
Net Debt Issues When data is available calculated as: [total debtt (item #03255) – total debtt-
1]/ total assetst-1. Otherwise the variable is calculated as: [short-term debtt 
(item #03051) + long-term debtt (item #03251) – (short-term debtt-1  + long-
term debtt-1)]/ total assetst-1(item #02999). Winsorized at the 1
st and 99th 
percentile 
Net Equity Issues When data is available calculated as: [proceeds from common and preferred 
stock issuest (item #04251) – purchases and retirements of common and 
preferred sharest-1 (item #04751)]/ total assetst-1. Otherwise the variable is 
calculated as: [book value of common equityt (item #03501) + preferred 
stockt (item #03451)- retained earningst (item #03495) – (book value of 
common equityt-1  + preferred stockt-1 - retained earningst-1)]/ total assetst-1.  
Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
Net External Finance The sum of net debt and equity issues as defined above. Winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentile 
Change in USD Exchange Rate [Domestic currency/USD end-of-year exchange rate in year  t – domestic 
currency/USD end-of-year exchange rate in year t-1]/domestic 
currency/USD end-of-year exchange rate in year t-1. 
Change in Total Assets [Total assetst(item #02999)  – total assetst-1 ]/total assetst-1.  Winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile 
Change in Cash Holdings [Cash and short term investmentst (item #02001) – cash and short term 
investmentst-1]/total assetst-1(item #02999).  Winsorized at the 1
st and 99th 
percentile 
Change in Non-Cash Assets Change in Total Assets – Change in Cash Holdings. Winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentile 
Dividends Dividends paidt (item #04551)/total assetst-1(item #02999).  Winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile 
Total Payouts [Dividends paidt(item #04551) + purchases and retirements of common and 
preferred sharest-1(item #04751)] /total assetst-1(item #02999).  Winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentile 
I(Euro Country) Indicator  variable =1 if the firm comes from Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, or 
Spain; zero otherwise 
I(Strong Euro Country) Indicator  variable =1 if the firm comes from Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany,  Luxembourg, or the Netherlands, Portugal; zero otherwise 
I(Weak Euro Country) Indicator  variable =1 if the firm comes from Finland, Ireland, Italy, , 
Portugal, or Spain; zero otherwise  
I(Post Euro) Indicator  variable =1 if the time period is 1999-2006; zero otherwise 
US industry Q The median US firm Q in each two-digit SIC code industry, calculated using 
all US firms with available data on Tobin’s Q in Compustat. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as [the book value of assets – the book value of equity + market 
value of equity/ book value of total assets. This variable is lagged one year. 
Log (Sales) The natural logarithm of net sales (item # 01001) expressed in real USD 
(baseline year = 2000). This variable is lagged one year and Winsorized at 
the 1st and 99th percentile. 
EBITDA/assets Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation and amortization (item 
#18198 or, alternatively, item #18191 + item #01151)/total assets (item 
#02999). This variable is lagged one year and Winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile. 
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Appendix A (continued)   
Variable Definition (item # refers to Worldscope field)  
Collateral/assets [Net property, plant, and equipment (item #02501) + inventories (item 
#02101)]/total assets(item #02999) . This variable is lagged one year and 
Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
I(Leverage>90%) Indicator variable =1 if Total liabilities/BV of assets >90%; zero otherwise. 
This variable is lagged one year. 
GDP Growth  Individual country real GDP growth (in USD terms). This variable is lagged 
one year. 
Term spread  Difference in yields between 10 year government bond and 6 month treasury 
bill for each individual sample country. This variable is lagged one year. 
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Appendix B 
Summary statistics  
This table presents average values for firm and country characteristics by country and EMU membership status (euro vs. non-euro countries). The sample is an 
unbalanced panel of 2,486 firms (29,932 firm-years) from eleven euro countries and five non-euro countries with data available in Worldscope over the time 
period 1991-2006. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 Firm characteristics Country characteristics 
Country 
 
 
#firms 
 
# firm-year 
obs 
 
Net External 
Finance 
 
Net Debt 
Issues 
 
Net Equity 
Issues 
U.S. 
Industry 
Q 
 
 
Log(Sales)
 
EBITDA/
Assets 
 
Collateral/
Assets 
 
# Country-
year obs 
 
GDP 
Growth 
 
Term 
Spread 
Change in 
USD FX 
Rate 
Austria 59 662 0.031 0.024 0.007 1.33 19.3 0.112 0.532 16 0.023 1.21 0.007 
Belgium 37 418 0.036 0.024 0.010 1.45 20.3 0.132 0.494 16 0.020 1.31 0.007 
Finland 76 975 0.020 0.007 0.011 1.45 19.4 0.138 0.510 16 0.021 1.38 -0.004 
France 366 4,257 0.033 0.019 0.013 1.51 19.7 0.124 0.390 16 0.019 0.83 0.008 
Germany 376 4,496 0.028 0.018 0.010 1.46 19.8 0.134 0.524 16 0.018 1.05 0.007 
Ireland 37 471 0.081 0.043 0.034 1.43 19.3 0.102 0.545 16 0.067 0.52 0.003 
Italy 114 1,438 0.038 0.026 0.010 1.42 20.0 0.112 0.435 16 0.014 1.15 -0.008 
Luxemburg 6 74 0.040 0.018 0.026 1.41 20.4 0.148 0.524 16 0.047 0.60 0.007 
Netherlands 123 1,527 0.049 0.029 0.019 1.49 20.1 0.150 0.510 16 0.026 1.17 0.007 
Portugal 55 575 0.057 0.038 0.019 1.47 18.8 0.115 0.527 16 0.023 0.32 -0.001 
Spain 99 1,205 0.054 0.032 0.019 1.43 19.8 0.117 0.527 16 0.030 0.79 -0.009 
All euro countries 1,348 16,098 0.037 0.022 0.013 1.46 19.7 0.127 0.479 176 0.028 0.94 0.002 
              
Denmark 120 1,454 0.036 0.026 0.009 1.52 18.9 0.124 0.536 16 0.021 0.73 0.007 
Norway 76 830 0.064 0.032 0.027 1.47 19.0 0.116 0.501 16 0.031 0.31 0.002 
Sweden 116 1,360 0.040 0.018 0.019 1.53 19.7 0.119 0.485 16 0.021 0.81 -0.003 
Switzerland 128 1,667 0.017 0.009 0.008 1.53 19.9 0.114 0.522 16 0.013 0.76 0.008 
United Kingdom 696 8,523 0.058 0.024 0.029 1.50 19.1 0.122 0.527 16 0.023 0.07 0.005 
All non-euro countries 1,138 13,834 0.049 0.022 0.023 1.51 19.2 0.121 0.522 80 0.022 0.53 0.004 
              
All countries 2,486 29,932 0.042 0.022 0.018 1.48 19.5 0.124 0.499 256 0.026 0.81 0.003 
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Appendix C  
The effect of the late convergence period on financing activities   
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate financing activity split by different industry 
groups. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-1998. I(Euro 
Country) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero otherwise. Strong euro countries are the countries that are 
classified as having strong currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro 
countries are the countries that are classified as having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).The late 
convergence period is defined as the years 1997 and 1998, i.e., the time period when the EMU candidate countries made final preparations to qualify for actually 
adopting the euro on January 1st, 1999.  See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. 
* and **, indicates significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively.  
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Late Convergence Period) -0.019  -0.016  -0.004  
 (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Late Convergence Period)  -0.028  -0.023  -0.006 
  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.005) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Late Convergence Period)  -0.002  -0.003  -0.001 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.004) 
U.S. Industry Q 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.013** 0.013** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log(Sales) -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.033** -0.033** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) 
EBITDA/Assets 0.296*** 0.294*** 0.236*** 0.233*** 0.051 0.050 
 (0.051) (0.050) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
Collateral/Assets -0.005 -0.007 -0.043 -0.044* 0.028 0.027 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
I(Leverage>90%) -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.065*** -0.065*** 0.018** 0.018** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP Growth 0.458** 0.346* 0.498*** 0.411** -0.007 -0.029 
 (0.160) (0.197) (0.140) (0.167) (0.074) (0.085) 
Term Spread -0.263 -0.086 -0.300* -0.163 0.026 0.061 
 (0.201) (0.232) (0.170) (0.191) (0.087) (0.104) 
Change in USD Exchange Rate -0.076* -0.074* -0.088** -0.087** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 R2  0.34 0.34 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.34 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 15,568 15,568 15,568 15,568 15,568 15,568 
Number of Firms 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 
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Appendix D. List of Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) directives included in FSAP index  
 
Directive  No Directive Name Category 
1998/26/EC Implementation of the Settlement Finality Directive Securities 
2000/46/EC Directive on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the businesses 
of electronic money institutions 
Banking 
2001/24/EC Directive on the reorganization and winding up of banks Banking 
2001/65/EC Directive amending the 4th and 7th Company Law Directives to allow fair 
value accounting 
Securities 
2001/86/EC Directive supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to 
the involvement of employees 
Securities 
2001/97/EC Directive amending the money laundering directive Banking 
2001/107/EC 1st Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities) 
Securities 
2001/108/EC 2nd Directive on UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities) 
Securities 
2002/47/EC Directive on financial collateral arrangements Securities 
2002/87/EC Directive on the supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate 
Banking 
2003/6/EC Directive on insider dealing and market manipulation Securities 
2003/48/EC Directive on the taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments Banking 
2003/51/EC Directive modernizing the accounting provisions of the 4th and 7th Company 
Law Directive 
Securities 
2003/71/EC Directive on prospectuses Securities 
2004/25/EC Directive on Take Over Bids Securities 
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Table 1 
Financing activity before and after the introduction of the euro  
The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven Euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five Non-euro countries (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-2006.  The post-euro time period is defined as 
the years 1999-2006. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
Panel A: Average Net External Finance 
 
 
 
# of firms 
Pre-euro time 
period 
Post-euro time 
period 
Difference  
(Post – Pre) 
 T-test of  
difference 
Euro countries  1,348 0.040 0.038 -0.002 0.72 
Strong euro countries 967 0.041 0.031 -0.010 2.80*** 
Weak euro countries 381 0.037 0.055 0.018 2.43*** 
Non-euro countries 1,138 0.074 0.044 -0.030 6.79** 
T-test:                                           
Euro vs. non-euro countries  7.00*** 1.57  4.91*** 
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries  6.47*** 3.04*** 3.34*** 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries   5.47*** 1.72* 5.56*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries   0.73 4.20*** 3.43*** 
Panel B: Average Net Debt Issues 
 
 
 
# of firms 
Pre-euro time 
period 
Post-euro time 
period 
Difference  
(Post – Pre) 
 T-test of  
difference 
Euro countries  1,348 0.022 0.025 0.003 1.12 
Strong euro countries 967 0.024 0.020 -0.004 1.45 
Weak euro countries 381 0.007 0.037 0.030 4.15*** 
Non-euro countries 1,138 0.030 0.023 -0.006 2.32*** 
T-test:                                           
Euro vs. non-euro countries  2.79*** 0.61 2.49**  
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries  1.90* 1.02 0.62 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries   3.28*** 3.34*** 4.76*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries   1.89* 4.08*** 4.32*** 
Panel C: Average Net Equity Issues 
 
 
 
# of firms 
Pre-euro time 
period 
Post-euro time 
period 
Difference  
(Post – Pre-) 
 T-test of  
difference 
Euro countries  1,348 0.016 0.012 -0.004 2.55** 
Strong euro countries 967 0.015 0.010 -0.005 2.95*** 
Weak euro countries 381 0.018 0.016 -0.002 0.48 
Non-euro countries 1,138 0.038 0.018 -0.021 8.93*** 
T-test:                                           
Euro vs. non-euro countries  8.32*** 2.53** 5.95***  
Strong-euro vs. non-euro countries  8.41*** 3.19*** 5.54*** 
Weak euro vs.  non-euro countries   5.59*** 0.45 4.39*** 
Strong- vs. weak-euro countries   0.82 1.98** 0.79 
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Table 2 
The effect of the euro on financing activities   
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate 
financing activity as measured by three different dependent variables (Net External Finance, Net Debt Issues, and 
Net Equity Issues). The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven euro countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-2006. I(Euro Country) is 
an indicator variable equal to one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero otherwise.  Strong euro countries 
are the countries that are classified as having strong currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro countries are the countries that are classified as 
having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).  I(Post-Euro) is 
an indicator variable equal to one if  the observation is in the post-euro time period (i.e., 1999-2006), and is zero 
otherwise. The estimated coefficients on the interaction I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) measures the average 
treatment effect from the introduction of the euro on the dependent variables. See Appendix A for other variable 
definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates 
significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.019*  0.008  0.010***  
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.003)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.009  0.001  0.008** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.042***  0.026***  0.014*** 
  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.004) 
U.S. Industry Q 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log(Sales) -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.024***
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
EBITDA/Assets 0.223*** 0.222*** 0.214*** 0.213*** 0.007 0.007 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.024) 
Collateral/Assets 0.008 0.006 -0.013 -0.015 0.013 0.013 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
I(Leverage>90%) -0.034** -0.034** -0.049*** -0.049*** 0.020** 0.020** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP Growth 0.544*** 0.496*** 0.548*** 0.512*** 0.017 0.009 
 (0.148) (0.132) (0.113) (0.112) (0.065) (0.061) 
Term Spread -0.403* -0.419* -0.378* -0.390* -0.031 -0.034 
 (0.195) (0.200) (0.188) (0.195) (0.064) (0.062) 
Change in USD Exchange Rate -0.072* -0.082* -0.101*** -0.108*** 0.018* 0.016 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.032) (0.034) (0.010) (0.010) 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.22 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.24 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 
Number of Firms 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 
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Table 3 
The effect of the euro on financing activities: Individual country results  
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate 
financing activity as measured by three different dependent variables (Net External Finance, Net Debt Issues, and 
Net Equity Issues). The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven euro countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five non-euro 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-2006. I(country name) is 
an indicator variable equal to one if  the firm belongs to country in question, and is zero otherwise. I(Post-Euro) is 
an indicator variable equal to one if  the observation is in the post-euro time period (i.e., 1999-2006), and is zero 
otherwise. Note that firms from United Kingdom constitute the benchmark sample in this table, and thus the 
estimated coefficients on I(country name) x I(Post-Euro) measures average treatment effects for firms in each 
respective country relative to firms in the United Kingdom. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. The same 
set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are 
available from the authors upon request.  Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. 
* and **, indicates significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 
Net External 
Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues
Explanatory variable: (1) (3) (5) 
I(Austria) x I(Post-Euro) 0.003 -0.012*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
I(Belgium) x I(Post-Euro) 0.003 -0.004* 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
I(France) x I(Post-Euro) 0.020*** 0.004 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
I(Germany) x I(Post-Euro) 0.001 -0.004 0.006** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
I(Luxembourg) x I(Post-Euro) 0.008*** -0.004** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
I(Netherlands) x I(Post-Euro) 0.031*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
I(Finland) x I(Post-Euro) 0.034*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
I(Ireland) x I(Post-Euro) -0.002 -0.009** 0.004* 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
I(Italy) x I(Post-Euro) 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
I(Portugal) x I(Post-Euro) 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) 
I(Spain) x I(Post-Euro) 0.082*** 0.047*** 0.029*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) 
I(Denmark) x I(Post-Euro) 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.006*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
I(Norway) x I(Post-Euro) -0.007* -0.005 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
I(Sweden x I(Post-Euro) 0.003 -0.002 0.003** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
I(Switzerland) x I(Post-Euro) 0.001 -0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Control Variables, Year Dummies, and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES 
R2  0.22 0.16 0.24 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 29,932 29,932 29,932 
Number of Firms 2,486 2,486 2,486 
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Table 4 
The effect of the euro on financing activities: Results by industry groups 
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate 
financing activity split by different industry groups. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven euro 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain) and five non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-
2006. I(Euro Country) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero 
otherwise. Strong euro countries are the countries that are classified as having strong currencies prior to adopting the 
euro (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro countries are the 
countries that are classified as having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain). I(Post-Euro) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the observation is in the post-euro time 
period (i.e., 1999-2006), and is zero otherwise. The industry classification is based on two-digit SIC codes, where 
Basic Industries = SIC codes 1-19 (Panel A), Manufacturing industries = SIC codes 20-39 (Panel B), Transportation, 
communications, and utilities industries = SIC codes 40-49 (Panel C), Trade industries = SIC codes 50-59(Panel D), 
and Services Industries = SIC codes 70-89 (Panel E). See Appendix A for other variable definitions. The same set of 
control variables as in Table 2 are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are available 
from the authors upon request. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, 
indicates significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively 
Panel A: Basic industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.056**  0.047***  0.011**  
 (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.005)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.047***  0.036***  0.014*** 
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.069*  0.064**  0.007 
  (0.035)  (0.025)  (0.008) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.26 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.26 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 2,389 
Number of Firms 192 192 192 192 192 192 
  
Panel B: Manufacturing industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.013  0.003  0.009**  
 (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.003)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.004  -0.003  0.007** 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.035**  0.019**  0.014** 
  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.21 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.22 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 15,749 15,749 15,749 15,749 15,749 15,749 
Number of Firms 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 1,291 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Panel C: Transportation, communications, and utilities industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.025  0.022  0.007  
 (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.005)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.009  0.005  0.007 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.005) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.048**  0.044***  0.008 
  (0.018)  (0.013)  (0.007) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.19 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.23 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 
Number of Firms 274 274 274 274 274 274 
 
Panel D: Trade industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.009  -0.000  0.009**  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.006  0.000  0.006 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.019  -0.003  0.020*** 
  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.005) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.24 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.24 0.24 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 4,701 4,701 4,701 4,701 4,701 4,701 
Number of Firms 391 391 391 391 391 391 
 
Panel E: Services industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.043**  0.018  0.021***  
 (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.006)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.029  0.003  0.022*** 
  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.007) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.079***  0.054***  0.019* 
  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.010) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.24 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.26 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 3,794 3,794 3,794 3,794 3,794 3,794 
Number of Firms 336 336 336 336 336 336 
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Table 5 
External finance dependence and the effect of the euro on financing activities   
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate 
financing activity split by external finance dependence. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven 
euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain) and five non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 
1991-2006. I(Euro Country) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero 
otherwise. Strong euro countries are the countries that are classified as having strong currencies prior to adopting the 
euro (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro countries are the 
countries that are classified as having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain). I(Post-Euro) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the observation is in the post-euro time 
period (i.e., 1999-2006), and is zero otherwise. Panel A presents results for firm in more external finance dependent 
industries, and Panel B presents results for firms in less external finance dependent industries. Following Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), external finance dependence is defined as the average fraction of capital expenditures not financed 
with internal funds for U.S. firms in the same industry during 1991-1997.  An industry (and consequently any firm 
in this industry) is then classified as more external finance dependent if its industry has a higher external finance 
dependence than the median industry represented in the sample. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. The 
same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are 
available from the authors upon request. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * 
and **, indicates significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively 
Panel A: More external finance dependent industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.027**  0.016*  0.011**  
 (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.016*  0.007  0.009* 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.056**  0.039***  0.016** 
  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.007) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.23 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.26 0.26 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations 14,574 14,574 14,574 14,574 14,574 14,574 
Number of Firms 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 1,232 
 
Panel B: Less external finance dependent industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.013  0.004  0.009***  
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.003)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.004  -0.003  0.007** 
  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.033***  0.019**  0.012*** 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.21 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations 15,358 15,358 15,358 15,358 15,358 15,358 
Number of Firms 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 
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Table 6 
Firm Size and the Effect of the Euro on Financing Activities   
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate 
financing activity split by firm size. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven euro countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five 
non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-2006. I(Euro 
Country) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero otherwise. Strong 
euro countries are the countries that are classified as having strong currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro countries are the countries that 
are classified as having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). 
I(Post-Euro) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the observation is in the post-euro time period (i.e., 1999-2006), 
and is zero otherwise. Firms are classified into large and small firms based on the following: (i) First we calculate 
each individual firm’s average sales in inflation-adjusted USD in the time period 1991-1997. (ii) Second, we classify 
a firm as large if this average is above the corresponding median for all sample firms; otherwise it is classified as 
small. Panel A presents results for large firms and Panel B present results for small firms. The same set of control 
variables as in Table 2 are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates 
significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively 
Panel A: Large firms  
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.025**  0.014*  0.011**  
 (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.015**  0.006  0.009** 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.050***  0.032***  0.016*** 
  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.005) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.21 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 15,782 
Number of Firms 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 
  
Panel B: Small firms  
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.013  0.005  0.008**  
 (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.003)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.004  -0.002  0.007* 
  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.035**  0.022**  0.011* 
  (0.014)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
Control Variables, YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.23 0.23 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.26 
Number of  Firm-Year Observations 14,150 14,150 14,150 14,150 14,150 14,150 
Number of Firms 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 1,243 
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Table 7  
The effect of the euro on financing activities: Early versus later time period effects   
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate financing activity split by external finance 
dependence. The sample is an unbalanced panel of firms from eleven euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and five non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-2006. I(Euro 
Country) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero otherwise. Strong euro countries are the countries that are 
classified as having strong currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro 
countries are the countries that are classified as having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). To gauge 
whether the impact of the euro on financing activities is transitory or more long-term, the post-euro time period is broken up in two time periods: 1999-2002 
versus 2003-2006. I(Post-Euro,1999-2002) and I(Post-Euro, 2003-2006) are the dummy variable indicators for these respective time periods. The same set of 
control variables as in Table 2 are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are available from the authors upon request. See Appendix 
A for other variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%-, and 1%-
levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro,1999-2002) 0.005  0.000  0.006  
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.004)  
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro, 2003-2006) 0.039***  0.020**  0.017***  
 (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro, 1999-2002)  -0.002  -0.006  0.005 
  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro, 2003-2006)  0.026***  0.011*  0.013*** 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro, 1999-2002)   0.023**  0.016  0.007** 
  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro, 2003-2006)   0.069***  0.040***  0.024*** 
  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.22 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.24 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 
Number of Firms 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 
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Table 8 
The effect of the euro on financing activities: The impact of transposition of FSAP directives   
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on corporate financing activity. The sample is an unbalanced 
panel of firms from eleven euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and 
five non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-2006. I(Euro Country) is an indicator variable equal to 
one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero otherwise. Strong euro countries are the countries that are classified as having strong currencies prior to 
adopting the euro (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro countries are the countries that are classified as 
having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). I(Post-Euro) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the 
observation is in the post-euro time period (i.e., 1999-2006), and is zero otherwise. To gauge whether the impact of the euro on financing activities is related to 
the transposition of FSAP directives among EU member countries we include the variable FSAP index; defined as log(1+cumulative directive transpositions at 
year t for country i). This variable will have a value of zero for the non-EU members (i.e., Norway and Switzerland). We only consider FSAP directives related 
to banking and securities markets. This variable is lagged one year relative to the dependent variables. The data on the timing on individual countries 
transposition of FSAP directives is from Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró (2010). The same set of control variables as in Table 2 are included but not 
explicitly reported to conserve space. Full results are available from the authors upon request. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Standard errors 
clustered at the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: 
 Net External Finance Net Debt Issues Net Equity Issues 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.017*  0.010  0.007  0.004  0.009**  0.007**  
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.007  0.001  -0.000  -0.004  0.008**  0.006 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.040***  0.034***  0.024***  0.021**  0.014***  0.012***
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) x FSAP Index   0.013*** 0.013***   0.007** 0.007**   0.004** 0.004**
   (0.004) (0.003)   (0.003) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
FSAP Index 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 8 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES 8 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 29,932 
Number of Firms 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 2,486 
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Table 9 
The effect of the euro on asset growth and corporate payout.   
The table presents panel data OLS regressions estimating the effect of the introduction of the euro on asset growth and corporate payout. The sample is an 
unbalanced panel of firms from eleven euro countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Spain) and five non-euro countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and U.K.) over the time period 1991-2006. I(Euro Country) is an indicator variable 
equal to one if  the firm belongs to a euro country, and is zero otherwise. Strong euro countries are the countries that are classified as having strong currencies 
prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Weak euro countries are the countries that are classified 
as having weak currencies prior to adopting the euro (i.e., Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). I(Post-Euro) is an indicator variable equal to one if  the 
observation is in the post-euro time period (i.e., 1999-2006), and is zero otherwise. Panel A presents results for the full sample. In Panels B and C the sample is 
split based on external finance dependence, where Panel B presents results for firm in more external finance dependent industries and Panel C presents results for 
firms in less external finance dependent industries. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), external finance dependence is defined as the average fraction of 
capital expenditures not financed with internal funds for U.S. firms in the same industry during 1991-1997.  An industry (and consequently any firm in this 
industry) is then classified as more external finance dependent if its industry has a higher external finance dependence than the median industry represented in the 
sample.  Panel D estimate the effects of the euro separately for the early (1999-2002) and later (2003-2006) post-euro time periods. For Panels B - D the same set 
of control variables as in Panel A are included but not explicitly reported to conserve space. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Standard errors clustered at 
the country level are reported within brackets. * and **, indicates significance at the 5%-, and 1%-levels, respectively. 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Panel A: Full sample 
 Dependent variable: 
 
 
Change in Total Assets 
Change in Non-Cash 
Assets 
Change in Cash 
Holdings 
 
Dividends 
 
Total Payout 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.037*  0.038**  -0.000  0.002  0.001  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.023  0.025  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.071***  0.070***  0.002  0.005  0.003 
  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
U.S. Industry Q 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Sales) -0.116*** -0.117*** -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EBITDA/Assets 0.656*** 0.655*** 0.640*** 0.639*** 0.022 0.022 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Collateral/Assets 0.020 0.018 -0.102*** -0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
I(Leverage>90%) -0.038 -0.038 -0.032 -0.032 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GDP Growth 1.626*** 1.557*** 1.658*** 1.594*** -0.027 -0.031 0.071 0.066* 0.057 0.053 
 (0.307) (0.287) (0.292) (0.274) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.036) (0.060) (0.054) 
Term Spread -1.527** -1.551** -1.402*** -1.425*** -0.064 -0.065 -0.054 -0.055 -0.027 -0.028 
 (0.524) (0.529) (0.476) (0.480) (0.092) (0.092) (0.047) (0.044) (0.060) (0.058) 
Change in USD Exchange Rate -0.294*** -0.307*** -0.303*** -0.316*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.060) (0.063) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.299 0.300 0.299 0.299 0.100 0.100 0.656 0.656 0.555 0.555 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 29,932 29,932 29,809 29,809 29,809 29,809 29,357 29,357 23,901 23,901 
Number of Firms 2,486 2,486 2,477 2,477 2,477 2,477 2,472 2,472 2,276 2,276 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Panel B: More external finance dependent industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 
 
Change in Total Assets 
Change in Non-Cash 
Assets 
Change in Cash 
Holdings 
 
Dividends 
 
Total Payout 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.050**  0.052**  -0.000  0.002  0.001  
 (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.031  0.035**  -0.001  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.099***  0.099***  0.002  0.005  0.004 
  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.30 0.30 0.300 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.67 0.67 0.57 0.57 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 14,574 14,574 14,481 14,481 14,481 14,481 14,301 14,301 11,848 11,848 
Number of Firms 1,232 1,232 1,225 1,225 1,225 1,225 1,224 1,224 1,125 1,125 
 
Panel C: Less external finance dependent industries 
 Dependent variable: 
 
 
Change in Total Assets 
Change in Non-Cash 
Assets 
Change in Cash 
Holdings 
 
Dividends 
 
Total Payout 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
I(Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro) 0.029  0.027  0.001  0.003  0.001  
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)  0.017  0.017  0.000  0.002  -0.000 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(Post-Euro)   0.054**  0.050**  0.003  0.005  0.003 
  (0.024)  (0.022)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.64 0.64 0.54 0.54 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 15,358 15,358 15,328 15,328 15,328 15,328 15,056 15,056 12,053 12,053 
Number of Firms 1,254 1,254 1,252 1,252 1,252 1,252 1,248 1,248 1,125 1,125 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Panel D: Early versus later time period effects 
 Dependent variable: 
 
 
Change in Total Assets 
Change in Non-Cash 
Assets 
Change in Cash 
Holdings 
 
Dividends 
 
Total Payout 
Explanatory variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
I(Euro Country) x I(1999-2002) 0.011  0.011  0.000  0.002  0.000  
 (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
I(Euro Country) x I(2003-2006) 0.075**  0.078***  -0.001  0.004  0.002  
 (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(1999-2002)  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.000 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
I(Strong Euro Country) x I(2003-2006)  0.061**  0.065***  -0.002  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(1999-2002)  0.045*  0.043**  0.002  0.003  0.001 
  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
I(Weak Euro Country) x I(2003-2006)  0.108***  0.108***  0.001  0.008  0.006 
  (0.033)  (0.028)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies and Fixed Firm Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2  0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.66 0.66 0.56 0.56 
Number of Firm-Year Observations 29,932 29,932 29,809 29,809 29,809 29,809 29,357 29,357 23,901 23,901 
Number of Firms 2,486 2,486 2,477 2,477 2,477 2,477 2,472 2,472 2,276 2,276 
 
 
 
